

LSU Department of Political Science
POLI 7935
Legislative Politics: Institutional Approaches
Fall Semester, 2015

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Office hours: Friday, 1:30 – 4:30; and by appointment.

Overview

This class focuses on legislative politics with an institutional lens. That is, we will concentrate on the literature on legislative politics that examines how the structure, rules, and organization of legislatures influences political behaviors and outcomes. This is a vast literature, so I've hand-picked a mixture of seminal works and debates and peppered-in new things as possible. I have also included long lists of recommended readings that may be of help in your research or in preparing for your comprehensive exams. Even with my efforts to include a lot of material, several areas are badly neglected. If you are interested in pursuing legislative politics as a research area please see me to talk about areas left untouched by this syllabus. Unfortunately, it is impossible to include all the material in one (or even two) semesters' time.

Evaluation

Your grade for the course will be measured by your weekly writing assignments (**50%**) related to the readings, your class participation (**25%**) and a final paper (**25%**). Letter grades will be assigned (and translated numerically) for final grading.

LSU Recently Adopted a Plus/Minus Grading System; I will apply the following in your final grade calculation:

96.5 and above	A+
93.50 – 96.49	A
90.00–93.49	A-
86.50–89.99	B+
83.50–86.49	B
80.00–83.49	B-
76.50–79.99	C+
73.50–76.49	C
70.00–73.49	C-
66.50–69.99	D+
63.50–66.49	D
60.00–63.49	D-
59.99 and below	F

Each assignment is outlined with more detail below:

Weekly critical writings: Each week you will be responsible for reading critically and comprehensively and crafting a **one page** response to the readings. Additional details are provided on the separate sheet (attached) describing what I am looking for in these assignments.

These papers are an opportunity for you to organize your general assessments of the readings and how they fit with the major theoretical and methodological questions of the course. Response papers are not to summarize the readings; rather, they are intended to encapsulate your summary of the usefulness, strengths and weaknesses of the research. Your paper should focus on the question I give out each week – which will focus on a theoretical or methodological concern from the week’s readings. The paper should answer the question by incorporating the readings and related issues. You do not have to address each of the readings if all are not relevant to the question. It is important not to exceed 1 single spaced page. This is a writing exercise; you need to learn to write a succinct argument.

Participation: Your weekly in-class discussion participation is critical to my ability to track your progress and your own development in understanding the material. This requires you to have a comprehensive understanding of the readings and (obviously) to come to class. You should be prepared to answer the following questions for each reading each class:

- (1) What is the main contribution of the reading to scholarly knowledge?
- (2) What theoretical tradition is the reading working within or in contrast to?
- (3) What hypotheses are offered for empirical evidence?
- (4) What are the data and measures used in the paper appropriate for evaluating the theory and hypothesis?
- (5) What are the main findings?
- (6) What are the implications of the theory and results for understanding American politics?
- (7) What are your criticisms of the research?

Final Paper: Each student will complete a major paper assignment. This paper should involve original empirical research on a topic of each student's own choosing that addresses a theoretically-grounded research question relevant to the study of legislative politics. Students will be expected to develop or test an empirical test of some hypothesis(es) pertaining to legislative politics. It is expected that the finished research papers will be, subject to modest revision, of a quality suitable for presentation at a professional conference or, ideally, submission to a refereed, scholarly political science journal. Each student should begin to consider possible research topics as soon as possible, and should consult with the instructor about potential topics and relevant literature. Further, each student is expected to clear the selected topic with the instructor before beginning work, and should be prepared to work closely with the instructor in fine-tuning the proposed research. Whether actual data analysis is required will depend on several variables and will be decided on a case by case basis in conjunction with the student. Research topics may be developed in one of three ways.

- (1) I will provide each student with a list of possible research topics. Any of these topics may be selected for the semester research paper.
- (2) Each student may select a pre-approved article from the syllabus and replicate it; the replication can be based on the data used by the original authors, or can be based on data collected for another (set of) year(s) and/or political system.
- (3) Each student may develop his/her own research idea consistent with his/her own interests and inclinations.

Solid rough drafts of all research papers are due in hardcopy form by NOON on Friday, November 20, 2015. Final drafts are due in hardcopy form by noon on Friday December 4, the same day you will present your paper conference style. Students should have their research topic selected and turn in a brief abstract of their proposed paper by October 2. Furthermore, all papers and drafts should be (1) typed and

double spaced with page numbers, (2) written in accordance with the APSR style manual, (3) proofread for mistakes, and (4) neat and professionally presented.

Cheating and Plagiarism: All students are expected to observe the University's rules against cheating and plagiarism. We will discuss more on this at length during the first class meeting.

Readings

There is only one required text for this course and it is available for download for free through the LSU library system. I do recommend some other books too.

Required:

Grimmer, Justin, Sean J. Westwood, and Solomon Messing. 2015. *The Impression of Influence: Legislator Communication, Representation, and Democratic Accountability*. Princeton University Press. (available for download through LSU library system)

Recommended:

Especially for those less familiar with how Congress works: Oleszek, Walter J. 2001. *Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process*. (5th edition or later). CQ Press.

Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll-Call Voting* (Oxford University Press; ISBN 0-195-05577-2).

Rohde. *Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House*.

Cox and McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan*. University of California Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. *Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Hall, Richard L. 1996. *Participation in Congress*. Yale University Press.

Arnold, R. Douglas.

Adler, E. Scott. 2002. *Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System*. The University of Chicago Press.

North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing The Commons*. Cambridge University Press.

Below is a schedule of assigned peer-reviewed journal article and other readings for the course. Most are journal articles that can be found via the LSU library system. Others are hard to find or book chapters which will be marked with am (M) to denote they can be found on the class moodle page.

Schedule:

Week 1 (August 26) – Syllabus and Instructions

Week 2 (September 4) – NO CLASS, Instructor (and a few classmates) at APSA but read and we will double the discussion during week 3 - General Approaches

Nelson Polsby. 1968. "The Institutionalization of the House of Representatives. *American Political Science Review*. 62: 144-168.

Fenno, Richard F. 1977. U.S. House Members in their Constituencies: An Exploration. *American Political Science Review*. 71(3): 883-917.

Fenno, Richard F. 1986. "Observation, Context and Sequence in the Study of Politics." *American Political Science Review*. 80(1): 3-15.

Kenneth Shepsle and Barry Weingast. 1994. Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 91(2):149-179

Diermeier, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel. 2003. "Institutionalism as a Methodology." *Journal of Theoretical Politics*. 15(2): 123-144.

Recommended:

Engerman, Stanley L. and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2008. "Debating the Role of Institutions in Political and Economic Development: Theory, History, and Findings." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 11: 119-135.

North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge University Press.

Ostrom, Elinor. 1990. *Governing The Commons*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3, 6.

Groseclose and King. 2001. "Committee Theories Reconsidered." In *Congress Reconsidered*. 7th edition. Edited by Lawrence Dodd and Bruce Oppenheimer. Washington D.C.: CQ Press. 191-216.

Michael Mezey. 1993. "Legislatures: Individual Purpose and Institutional Performance." 335-364 in Ada W. Finifter (ed). *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II*.

Polsby and Schickler. 2002. "Landmarks in the Study of Congress." *Annual Reviews of Political Science* 5:333-367.

Hibbing, "Legislative Institutionalization with Illustrations from the British House of Commons," *AJPS* (August 1988: 681-712).

Squire, "The Theory of Legislative Institutionalization and the California Assembly," *JOP* (November 1992: 1026-54).

- Patterson, "Legislative Institutions and Institutionalization in the United States," *Journal of Legislative Studies* (1995: 10-29).
- Haeberle, "The Institutionalization of the Subcommittee in the U.S. House of Representatives," *JOP* (November 1978: 1054-65).
- Canon, "The Institutionalization of Leadership in the U.S. Congress," *LSQ* (August 1989: 415-43).
- Rosenthal, "State Legislative Development: Observations from Three Perspectives," *LSQ* (May 1996: 169-98).
- Berkman, "Former State Legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives: Institutional and Policy Mastery," *LSQ* (February 1993: 77-104).
- Francis, "Costs and Benefits of Legislative Service in the American States," *AJPS* (August 1985: 626-42).
- Grumm, "The Effects of Legislative Structure on Legislative Performance," in Hofferbert and Sharkansky (eds.), *State and Urban Politics*.
- Price, "Congress and the Evolution of Legislative Professionalism," in Ornstein (ed.), *Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform*.
- Squire, "Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity in State Legislatures," *LSQ* (February 1992: 69-80).
- Mooney, "Citizens, Structures, and Sister States: Influences on State Legislative Professionalism," *LSQ* (February 1995: 47-68).
- Squire, "Another Look at Legislative Professionalization and Divided Government in the States," *LSQ* (August 1997: 417-32).
- Berry, Berkman, and Schneiderman, "Legislative Professionalism and Incumbent Reelection: The Development of Institutional Boundaries," *APSR* (December 2000: 859-74).
- King, "Changes in Professionalism in U.S. State Legislatures" *LSQ* (May 2000: 327-43).

Week 3 (September 11) Legislative Organization: The Distributive Approach

- Barry Weingast and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organization of Congress, or Why Legislatures, Like Firms, are not Organized as Markets." *Journal of Political Economy* 96(1): 132-163.
- Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." *American Political Science Review*. 81(1): 85-104.
- Krehbiel, Keith, Kenneth A. Shepsle and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Why Are Congressional Committees Powerful?" *American Political Science Review*. 81(3): 929-945.
- Diermeier, Daniel., Carlo Prato, and Razvan Vlaicu. 2014. "Procedural Choice in Majoritarian Organizations." *American Journal of Political Science*. DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12142

Recommended

E. Scott Adler. 2000. "Constituency Characteristics and the "Guardian" Model of Appropriations Subcommittees, 1959-1998." *American Journal of Political Science*. 44: 104-114.

Hall and Evans. 1990. "The Power of Subcommittees." *Journal of Politics*

Fenno, R. F. 1973. *Congressmen in Committees*. Little Brown and Company. Chapters 1-4.

Adler, E. Scott and John S. Lapinski. 1997. "Demand-Side Theory and Congressional Committee Composition: A Constituency Characteristics Approach." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41(3): 895-918.

Richard L. Hall and Frank W. Wayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees." *APSR* 84: 797-820.

Week 4 (September 18) Legislative Organization: The Informational Approach

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. University of Michigan Press. Chapters 1-3. (M)

Krehbeil, Keith. 1990. "Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers?" *American Political Science Review*. 84(1): 149-163.

Groseclose, Tim. 1994. "Testing Committee Composition Theories for the U.S. Congress." *Journal of Politics*. 56(2): 440-458.

Lin, Nick. 2015. "Informative Committees and Legislative Performance in the American States." *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. 40(3): 391-415. DOI: 10.1111/lsq.12081

Recommended

Krehbiel, Keith, and Thomas Gilligan (1990). "Organization of Informational Committee in a Rational Legislature". *American Journal of Political Science* 34:531-564.

Krehbiel, *Information and Legislative Organization*. Remainder.

Rohde, "Parties and Committees in the House: Member Motivations, Issues, and Institutional Arrangements," *LSQ* (August 1994: 341-60).

Gilligan and Krehbiel, "The Gains from Exchange Hypothesis of Legislative Organizations," *LSQ* (May 1994: 181-214).

Baron, "Legislative Organization with Informational Committees," *AJPS* (July 2000: 485-505).

Week 5 (September 25) Legislative Organization: The Partisan Approach (and conclusions)

- Schickler, Eric and Andrew Rich. 1997. "Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41(4): 1340-1375.
- Cox, Gary C. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1997. "Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: Assessing Schickler and Rich's Evidence." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41(4): 1376-1386.
- Cox, Gary C. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge University Press. (Excerpts)
- Carlin, Ryan E. and Mason Moseley. 2015. "Good Democrats, Bad Targets: Democratic Values and Clientelistic Vote Buying." *Journal Of Politics*. 77(1): 14-26.
- Robinson, Gregory. 2015. "Competing Agendas in Theories of Congress: Assessing Agenda Control Using Counterfactual Data." *Journal Of Politics*. 77(3): 749-761.
- Recommended:
- Cox and McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan*. University of California Press.
- Kiewiet and McCubbins, *The Logic of Delegation: Congressional Parties and the Appropriation Process*.
- Smith, "Positive Theories of Congressional Parties," *LSQ* (May 2000: 193-215).
- Cox and McCubbins, "Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party Government in the House," *LSQ* (May 1994: 215-32).
- Smith and Gamm, "The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress," in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.), *Congress Reconsidered* (7th edition).
- Aldrich and Rohde, "The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection," in Dodd and Oppenheimer (eds.), *Congress Reconsidered* (7th edition).
- Aldrich and Battista, "Conditional Party Government in the States," *AJPS* (January 2002: 164-72).
- Taylor, "Conditional Party Government and Campaign Contributions: Insights from the Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverage Industries," *AJPS* (April 2003: 293-304).
- Roberts and Smith, "Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971-2000," *AJPS* (April 2003: 305-17).
- Moscardelli, Haspel, and Wike, "Party Building Through Campaign Finance Reform: Conditional Party Government in the 104th Congress," *JOP* (August 1998: 691-704).
- Schickler and Rich, "Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural Coalitions in the House," *AJPS* (October 1997: 1340-75).

Cox and McCubbins, "Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Changes: Assessing Schickler and

- Rich's Evidence," *AJPS* (October 1997: 1376-86).
- Schickler and Rich, "Party Government in the House Reconsidered: A Response to Cox and McCubbins," *AJPS* (October 1997: 1387-94).
- Nye, "Party Support in the U.S. House of Representatives: Generational Replacement, Seniority, or Member Conversion" *APQ* (April 1994: 175-89).
- Leyden and Borrelli, "An Investment in Goodwill: Party Contributions and Party Unity Among U.S. House Members in the 1980s," *APQ* (October 1994: 421-52).
- Kolodny and Dwyre, "Party-Orchestrated Activities for Legislative Party Goals: Campaigns for Majorities in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 1990s," *Party Politics* (July 1998: 275-96).
- Bianco, "Party Campaign Committees and the Distribution of Tally Program Funds," *LSQ* (August 1999: 451-69).
- Wright, "The Caucus Reelection Requirement and the Transformation of House Committee Chairs, 1959–94," *LSQ* (August 2000: 469-80).
- Krehbiel, "Paradoxes of Parties in Congress," *LSQ* (February 1999: 31-64).
- Aldrich and Rohde, "The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics," *Political Science Quarterly* (Winter 1998: 541-69).
- Francis, "Leadership, Party Caucuses, and Committees in U.S. State Legislatures," *LSQ* (May 1985: 243-57).
- Green, "Institutional Change, Party Discipline, and the House Democratic Caucus, 1911–19," *LSQ* (November 2002: 601-33).
- Remington and Smith, "The Development of Parliamentary Parties in Russia," *LSQ* (November 1995: 457-90).
- Chaisty, "Defending the Institutional Status Quo: Communist Leadership of the Second Russian State Duma, 1996–99," *LSQ* (February 2003: 5-28).

Week 6 (October 2) Parties and Leaders: Conditional Party Government and Critics

- Krehbiel., Keith. 1993. "Where's the Party?" *British Journal of Political Science*. 23(2): 235-266.
- Aldrich, John H. and David W. Rohde. 2001. "The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection." In *Congress Reconsidered, 7th edition*. Edited by Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Pages 269-292.
- Aldrich, John, and James Battista. 2002. "Conditional Party Government in the States." *American Journal of Political Science*. 46(1): 164-172.
- Binder, Sarah. 2015. "The Dysfunctional Congress." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 18: 85-101.

Recommended:

Rohde. *Parties and Leaders in the Post Reform House*.

Groseclose and Stewart, "The Value of Committee Seats in the House, 1947-91," *AJPS* (April 1998: 453-74).

Parker, "The Selection of Committee Leaders in the U.S. House of Representatives," *APQ* (January 1979: 71-93).

Collie and Roberts, "Trading Places: Choice and Committee Chairs in the U.S. Senate, 1950-1986," *JOP* (February 1992: 231-45).

Deering, "Career Advancement and Subcommittee Chairs in the U.S. House of Representatives: 86th to 101st Congress," *APQ* (January 1996: 3-23).

Week 7 (October 9) Congressional Committees and the Legislative Process, some newer stuff

Kellermann, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2009. "Congressional Careers, Committee Assignments, and Seniority Randomization in the US House of Representatives." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 4: 87-101.

Grimmer, Justin and Eleanor Neff Powell. 2013. "Congressmen in Exile: The Politics and Consequences of Involuntary Committee Removal." *Journal of Politics* 75(4): 907-920.

Week 8 (October 16) Rules and Procedures

Binder, Sarah. 1996. "The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice: Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990." *American Political Science Review*. 90(1): 8-20.

Dion, Douglas and John D. Huber. 1997. "Sense and Sensibility: The Role of Rules." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41(3): 945-957.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1997. "Rejoinder to "Sense and Sensibility." *American Journal of Political Science*. 41(3): 958-964.

Berliner, Daniel and Aaron Erlich. 2015. "Competing for Transparency: Political Competition and Institutional Reform in Mexican States." *American Political Science Review*. 109(1): 110-128. doi:10.1017/S0003055414000616

Recommended

Maltzman, *Competing Principals: Committees, Parties, and the Organization of Congress*. Cox, "On the Effects of Legislative Rules," *LSQ* (May 2000: 169-92).

Binder, "Partisanship and Procedural Choice: Institutional Change in the Early Congress, 1789-1823," *JOP* (November 1995: 1093-1118).

Binder and Smith, "Political Goals and Procedural Choice in the Senate," *JOP* (May 1998: 398-416).

Binder and Smith, *Politics or Principle? Filibustering in the United States Senate*.

Alter and McGranahan, "Reexamining the Filibuster and Proposal Powers in the Senate," *LSQ* (May 2000: 259-84).

Huber, "Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States," *APSR* (September 1992: 675-87).

Sinclair, "House Special Rules and the Institutional Design Controversy," *LSQ* (1994:477-94).

Dion and Huber, 1996. "Procedural Choice and the House Committee on Rules," *JOP* (pp.25-53).

Shepsle, *The Changing Textbook Congress*.

Frechette, Kagel, and Lehrer, "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Experimental Investigation of Open versus Closed Amendment Rules," *APSR* (May 2003: 221-32).

Cox, "On the Effects of Legislative Rules," *LSQ* (May 2000: 169-92).

Marshall, "Explaining the Role of Restrictive Rules in the Postreform House," *LSQ* (February 2002: 61-85).

Gilligan and Krehbiel, "Complex Rules and Congressional Outcomes: An Event Study of Energy Tax Legislation," *JOP* (August 1988: 625-54).

Bach, "Suspension of the Rules, The Order of Business, and the Development of Congressional Procedure," *LSQ* (February 1990: 49-64).

Wilkerson, "Killer Amendments in Congress," *APSR* (September 1999: 535-52).

Jenkins and Munger, "Investigating the Incidence of Killer Amendments in Congress," *JOP* (May 2003: 498-517).

Smith and Flathman, "Managing the Senate Floor: Complex Unanimous Consent Agreements Since the 1950s," *LSQ* (August 1989: 349-74).

Ainsworth and Ionszki, "Unanimous Consent Agreements as Leadership Tools," *LSQ* (May 1995: 177-96).

Glazer, Griffin, Grofman, and Wattenberg, "Strategic Vote Delay in the U.S. House of Representatives," *LSQ* (February 1995: 37-46).

Krutz, "Tactical Maneuvering on Omnibus Bills in Congress," *AJPS* (January 2001: 210-23).

Fink, "Representation by Deliberation: Changes in the Rules of Deliberation in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1789-1844," *JOP* (November 2000: 1109-1125).

Rasch, "Parliamentary Floor Voting Procedures and Agenda Setting in Europe," *LSQ* (February 2000: 3-23).

Krehbiel and Meirowitz, "Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the

Motion to Recommit," *LSQ* (May 2002: 191-217).

Hixon and Marshall, "Examining Claims about Procedural Choice: The Use of Floor Waivers in the U.S. House," *PRQ* (December 2002: 923-38).

Week 9 (October 23) Universalism and the Pork Barrel in Congress

Emerson M.S. Niou and Peter C. Ordeshook (1985) "Universalism in Congress." *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 29, No. 2 (May, 1985), pp. 246-258.

Stein, Robert M. and Kenneth N. Bickers, "Universalism and the Electoral Connection: A Test and Some Doubts," *Political Research Quarterly* (June 1994: 295-318).

Weingast, Barry R. "Reflections on Distributive Politics and Universalism," *Political Research Quarterly* (June 1994: 319-28).

Bickers, Kenneth N. and Robert M Stein, "Response to Barry Weingast's Reflections," *Political Research Quarterly* (June 1994: 329-34).

Bickers, Kenneth N. and Robert M. Stein, "The Electoral Dynamics of the Federal Pork Barrel," *American Journal of Political Science* (November 1996:1300-26).

Dynes, Adam M. and Gregory A. Huber. 2015. "Partisanship and the Allocation of Federal spending." *American Political Science Review*. 109(1): 172-186. doi:10.1017/S000305541400063X.

Recommended:

Richard Hall. 1996. *Participation in Congress*.

Ferejohn, *Pork Barrel Politics*.

Arnold, *Congress and the Bureaucracy*.

Stein and Bickers, *Perpetuating the Pork Barrel: Policy Subsystems and American Democracy*.

Collie, "The Legislature and Distributive Policy Making in Formal Perspective," *LSQ* (November 1988: 427-58).

Ferejohn, "Logrolling in an Institutional Context: A Case Study of Food Stamp Legislation," in Wright, Rieselbach, and Dodd (eds.), *Congress and Policy Change*.

Wilson, "An Empirical Test of Preferences for the Political Pork Barrel: District Level Appropriations for River and Harbor Legislation, 1889-1913," *AJPS* (November 1986: 729-54).

Hamman, "Universalism, Program Development, and the Distribution of Federal Assistance," *LSQ* (November 1993: 553-68).

Alvarez and Saving, "Deficits, Democrats, and Distributive Benefits: Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel in the 1980s," *PRQ* (December 1997: 809-32).

Rundquist, Lee, and Rhee, "The Distributive Politics of Cold War Defense Spending: Some State Level Evidence," *LSQ* (May 1996: 265-82).

Lee, "Representation and Public Policy: The Consequences of Senate Apportionment for the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds," *JOP* (February 1998: 34-62).

Moore and Hibbing, "Length of Congressional Tenure and Federal Spending: Were the Voters of Washington State Correct?" *APQ* (April 1996: 131-49).

Carsey and Rundquist, "Party and Committee in Distributive Politics: Evidence from Defense Spending," *JOP* (November 1999: 1156-69).

Lee, "Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics," *APSR* (March 2000: 59-72).

Hurwitz, Moiles, and Rohde, "Distributive and Partisan Issues in Agriculture Policy in the 104th House," *APSR* (December 2001: 911-22).

Martin, "Voting's Rewards: Voter Turnout, Attentive Publics, and Congressional Allocation of Federal Money," *AJPS* (January 2003: 110-27).

Potoski and Talbert, "The Dimensional Structure of Polity Outputs: Distributive Policy and Roll Call Voting," *PRQ* (December 2000: 695-710).

Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, and Sigelman, "Partisanship, Blame Avoidance, and the Distribution of Legislative Pork," *AJPS* (July 2002: 515-25).

Bickers and Stein, "The Congressional Pork Barrel in a Republican Era," *JOP* (November 2000: 1070-86).

Soherr-Hadwiger, "Military Construction Policy: A Test of Competing Explanations of Universalism in Congress," *LSQ* (February 1998: 57-78).

Hood, Morris, and Neeley, "Penny Pinching or Politics? The Line Item Veto and Military Construction Appropriations," *PRQ* (December 1999: 753-66).

Thies, "When Will Pork Leave the Farm? Institutional Bias in Japan and the United States," *LSQ* (November 1998: 467-92).

Stratmann and Baur, "Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German *Bundestag*: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems," *AJPS* (July 2002: 506-14).

Denemark, "Partisan Pork Barrel in Parliamentary Systems: Australian Constituency-Level Grants," *JOP* (August 2000: 896-915).

Week 10 (October 30) -NO CLASS FALL BREAK

Week 11 (November 6) Ambition, Strategy, Careers, and Term Limits

- Black, Gordon S. 1972. "A Theory of Political Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives." *American Political Science Review*. 66(1): 144-159.
- Rohde, David W. 1979. "Risk Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the United States House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science*. 23(1): 1-26/
- Canon, David T. 1993. "Sacrificial Lambs or Strategic Politicians: Political Amateurs in U.S. House Elections." *American Journal of Political Science*. 37(4): 1119-1141.
- Donovan, Todd and Joseph R. Snipp, "Support for Legislative Term Limitations in California: Group Representation, Partisanship, and Campaign Information," *Journal Of Politics* (May 1994: 492-501).
- Karp, Jeffrey A. "Explaining Public Support for Term Limits." *Public Opinion Quarterly* (1995: 373-91).
- Stein, Robert M., Martin Johnson, and Stephanie S. Post, "Public Support for Term Limits: Another Look at Conventional Thinking," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* (August 2002: 459-80)
- Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2011. "Women Who Win: Social Backgrounds, Paths to Power, and Political Ambition in Latin American Legislatures." *Politics & Gender*. 7 (1): 1-33. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X10000541>

Recommended

- Squire, "Membership Turnover and the Efficient Processing of Legislation," *LSQ* (February 1998: 23-32).
- Weissert, "Issue Salience and State Legislative Effectiveness," *LSQ* (November 1991: 509-20).
- Dodd, "A Theory of Congressional Cycles: Solving the Puzzle of Change," in Wright, Rieselbach, and Dodd (eds.), *Congress and Policy Change*.
- Hibbing, "Contours of the Modern Congressional Career," *APSR* (June 1991: 405-28).
- Squire, "Career Opportunities and Membership Stability in Legislatures," *LSQ* (February 1988: 65-82).
- Polsby, Gallagher, and Rundquist, "The Growth of the Seniority System in the U.S. House of Representatives," *APSR* (September 1969: 787-807).
- McKelvey and Riezman, "Seniority in Legislatures," *APSR* (December 1992: 951-65).

Week 12 (November 13) Congress and Interest Groups/Congress and the Bureaucracy

- Diermeier, Daniel and Roger B. Myerson. 1999. "Bicameralism and its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures." *American Economic Review*. 89(5): 1182-1196.

Austen-Smith, David and John R. Wright, 1994. "Counteractive Lobbying." *American Journal of Political Science*. 38(1): 25-44.

Austen-Smith & Wright vs. Baumgartner & Leech, AJPS 1996

Bawn, Kathleen, Martin Cohen, David Karol, Seth Masket, Hans Noel, and John Zaller, 2012. "A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics" *Perspectives on Politics*. 10(3): 571-597. doi:10.1017/S1537592712001624

McCubbins, Mathew D. and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms." *American Journal of Political Science*. 28(1): 165-179.

McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "Administrative Procedures as an Instrument of Political Control." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*. 3(2): 243-277.

Recommended – congress and interest groups

Wright, *Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence*.

Hansen, *Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981*.

Kollman, *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies*.

Smith, "Interest Group Influence in the U.S. Congress," *LSQ* (February 1995: 89-140).

Welch, "Campaign Contributions and Legislative Voting: Milk Money and Dairy Price Supports," *WPQ* (December 1982: 478-95).

Wright, "PACs, Contribution, and Roll Calls: An Organizational Perspective," *APSR* (June 1985: 400-14).

Wright, "PAC Contributions, Lobbying, and Representation," *JOP* (August 1989: 713-29).

Wright, "Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives," *APSR* (June 1990: 417-38).

Hall and Wayman, "Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees," *APSR* (September 1990: 797-820).

Fleisher, "PAC Contributions and Congressional Voting on National Defense," *LSQ* (August 1993: 391-410).

Langbein, "Money and Access: Some Empirical Evidence," *JOP* (November 1986: 1052-62).

Langbein and Lotwis, "The Political Efficacy of Lobbying and Money: Gun Control in the U.S. House, 1986," *LSQ* (August 1990: 413-40).

- Calcagno and Jackson, "Political Action Committee Spending and Senate Roll-Call Voting," *Public Choice* (December 1998: 569-85).
- Romer and Snyder, "An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamics of PAC Contributions," *AJPS* (August 1994: 745-69).
- Grenzke, "PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency is Complex," *AJPS* (February 1989: 1-24).
- Evans, "Oil PACs and Aggressive Contribution Strategies," *JOP* (November 1988: 1047-56).
- Conybeare and Squire, "Political Action Committees and the Tragedy of the Commons: The Case of Nonconnected PACS," *APQ* (April 1994: 154-74).
- Engel and Jackson, "Wielding the Stick Instead of Its Carrot: Labor PAC Punishment of Pro-NAFTA Democrats," *PRQ* (September 1998: 813-28).
- Cox and Magar, "How Much is Majority Status in the U.S. Congress Worth?" *APSR* (June 1999: 299-310).
- Wawro, "A Panel Probit Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Roll-Call Votes," *AJPS* (July 2001: 563-79).
- Gordon, "All Votes Are Not Created Equal: Campaign Contributions and Critical Votes," *JOP* (February 2001: 249-69).
- Hojnacki and Kimball, "PAC Contributions and Lobbying Contacts in Congressional Committees," *PRQ* (March 2001: 161-80).
- Box Steffensmeier and Grant, "All in a Day's Work: The Financial Rewards of Legislative Effectiveness," *LSQ* (November 1999: 511-23).
- Taylor, "Conditional Party Government and Campaign Contributions: Insights from the Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverage Industries," *AJPS* (April 2003: 293-304).
- Evans, "Before the Roll Call: Interest Group Lobbying and Public Policy Outcomes in House Committees," *PRQ* (June 1996: 287-304).
- Fowler and Shaiko, "The Grass Roots Connection: Environmental Activists and Senate Roll Calls," *AJPS* (August 1987: 484-510).
- Haider-Markel, "Redistributing Values in Congress: Interest Group Influence Under Sub-Optimal Conditions," *PRQ* (March 1999: 113-44).
- Ainsworth, "The Role of Legislators in the Determination of Interest Group Influence," *LSQ* (November 1997: 517-34).
- Caldeira and Wright, "Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests, Supreme Court Nominations, and the United States Senate," *AJPS* (April 1998: 499-523).
- Kollman, "Inviting Friends to Lobby: Interest Groups, Ideological Bias, and Congressional

- Committees," *AJPS* (April 1997: 519-44).
- Hojnacki and Kimball, "Organizational Interests and the Decision of Whom to Lobby in Congress," *APSR* (December 1998: 775-90).
- Hojnacki and Kimball, "The Who and How of Organizations' Lobbying Strategies in Committee," *JOP* (November 1999: 999-1024).
- Flemming, MacLeod, and Talbert, "Witnesses at the Confirmation? The Appearance of Organized Interests at Senate Hearings on Federal Judicial Appointments, 1945-1992," *PRQ* (September 1998: 617-32).
- Nownes, "Solicited Advice and Lobbyist Power: Evidence from Three American States," *LSQ* (February 1999: 113-124).
- Wolak, Newmark, McNoldy, Lowery, and Gray, "Much of Politics Is Still Local: Multi-State Lobbying in State Interest Communities," *LSQ* (November 2002: 527-55).
- Heitshusen, "Interest Group Lobbying and U.S. House Decentralization: Linking Informational Focus to Committee Hearing Appearances," *PRQ* (March 2000: 151-76).
- Kenny, McBurnett, and Bordua, "The Impact of Political Interests in the 1994 Elections: The Role of the National Rifle Association," unpublished paper, 1999.
- Balla and Wright, "Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy," *AJPS* (October 2001: 799-812).
- Brunell, Koetzle, Dinardo, Grofman, and Feld, "The $R^2 = .93$: Where Then Do They Differ? Comparing Liberal and Conservative Interest Group Ratings," *LSQ* (February 1999: 87-101).
- Wright, "Interest Groups, Congressional Reform, and Party Government in the United States," *LSQ* (May 2000: 217-35).
- Berkman, "Legislative Professionalism and the Demand for Groups: The Institutional Context of Interest Population Density," *LSQ* (November 2001: 661-79).
- Krehbiel, "Deference, Extremism, and Interest Group Ratings," *LSQ* (February 1994: 61-78).
- Wright, "Interest Groups, Congressional Reform, and Party Government in the United States," *LSQ* (May 2000: 217-36).

Recommended – congress and the bureaucracy

- Ogul, *Congress Oversees the Bureaucracy*, chapter 1.
- Ogul and Rockman, "Overseeing Oversight: New Departures and Old Problems," *LSQ* (February 1990: 5-24).

Dodd and Schott, *Congress and the Administrative State*, chapters 5-6.

Aberbach, *Keeping a Watchful Eye: The Politics of Congressional Oversight*, chapters 2-4.

Bibby, "Committee Characteristics and Legislative Oversight of Administration," *MWJPS* (February 1966: 78-98).

Johannes, "Casework as a Technique of U.S. Congressional Oversight," *LSQ* (August 1979: 325-51).

Aberbach, "Changes in Congressional Oversight," *American Behavioral Scientist* (May/June 1979: 493-515).

McCubbins and Schwarz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms," *AJPS* (February 1984: 165-79).

Scicchitano, "Congressional Oversight: The Case of the Clean Air Act," *LSQ* (August 1986: 393-407).

Ferejohn and Shipan, "Congressional Influence on Administrative Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy," in Dodd and Oppenheimer, *Congress Reconsidered* (4th edition).

Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler, "Legislative and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy," *AJPS* (April 2001: 330-45).

Balla and Wright, "Interest Groups, Advisory Committees, and Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy," *AJPS* (October 2001: 799-812).

Huber and Shipan, "The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs," *LSQ* (February 2000: 25-52).

Weissert and Silberman, "Legislative Demands for Bureaucratic Policymaking: The Case of State Medical Boards," *LSQ* (February 2002:123-139).

Week 13 (November 20) New and Cool Stuff - Solid Rough Drafts due in class

Grimmer, Justin, Sean J. Westwood, and Solomon Messing. 2015. *The Impression of Influence: Legislator Communication, Representation, and Democratic Accountability*. Princeton University Press.

Week 14 (November 27) NO CLASS – THANKSGIVING BREAK

Week 15 (December 4) – Presentations of Research Papers and Final Papers Due in Class